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Abstract 
  Singapore is an interesting example of how the pattern of foreign investment changes 
with economic development. In this paper, we analyze inbound and outbound investment 
between Singapore and a sample of industrialized and developing countries over the period 
1984-2003.  We find that Singapore’s two-way investment with industrialized nations has 
shifted into skill-seeking activities over the period, while Singapore’s investments in 
developing countries have increased sharply and become concentrated in labor-seeking 
activities. Singapore’s increasing skill abundance relative to all countries in our sample 
accounted for 41 per cent of average inbound stocks during the period, i.e. US$18 billion 
annually; the corresponding figure for outbound stocks was 40 per cent, i.e. US$5.51 billion 
annually.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we explore the influence of skills on foreign investment in a small 
newly industrialized country (NIC), Singapore.  Singapore has been successful in attracting 
FDI during its period of rapid economic development (Shin, 2005).  The country has also 
experienced significant deepening of its human capital stock during this period.  It is possible 
that the rapid growth of its skill endowments has been a significant factor in attracting 
foreign investment, with causation running in both directions.  
One framework within which to analyze the role of skill endowments on FDI location 
is the Knowledge Capital (KK) model.  This model has been applied to a number of 
industrialized countries, including the United States (Carr, Markusen and Maskus 2001, 
hereafter CMM).  The KK model has, however, not been tested for any of the NICs and has 
been applied to investment data for only one developing country, China (Gao, 2003).   
At the time of independence in 1965, Singapore was a relatively unskilled-labor-
abundant and natural-resource-poor developing country with high levels of poverty and low 
economic growth.  Shortly thereafter the government of Singapore (GOS) adopted an 
industrialization strategy, including opening the country to foreign investment in most 
sectors.  The GOS actively promotes cross-border investment and has removed almost all 
barriers to trade (Ramkishnen and Thangavelu, 2008).  In addition, it has taken measures to 
facilitate trade and investment as well as inflows of skilled labor.  Singapore is a member of 
several regional and international trade and investment forums (including ASEAN, APEC, 
WTO, etc) and has negotiated bilateral trade and investment pacts with many countries 
around the world. 
Until the late 1970s, multinational enterprises (MNEs) were attracted by the country’s 
large low-skilled population and low wages (Low, 1999).  By the early 1980s, Singapore’s     
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economy was growing rapidly and wages were escalating, leading MNEs producing labor-
intensive goods to look elsewhere.  In response, the GOS developed strategies to attract 
foreign investment in higher-technology goods by focusing on developing the skills of its 
population (Low, 1999)  Between 1984 and 2003, Singapore rapidly closed its skills gap with 
most industrialized countries through training and expanding education (Anwar, 2008).  The 
existence of skill-deepening may be seen from the fact that skilled employment increased 
from 16 percent of the labor force in 1982 to 33 percent of the labor force in 2003 
(International Labor Organization). 
 Compared to other industrialized countries, Singapore has few domestically owned 
and headquartered MNEs.  Rather, its strategy has been to make the country an attractive 
investment location for foreign MNEs.  This policy, generally known as the "complementary 
strategy" (Shin 2005), mostly emphasized investments in skills development (Chang, 2005; 
Hu, 2004).   In the mid 1980s, the GOS adopted a policy of promoting and developing 
Singapore as a regional hub (Dobson and Chia, 1997).  There were two strategic elements: 
developing highly specialized niches and upgrading the low productivity domestic sector. 
The Singapore government adopted the cluster strategy of promoting key industries in 
electronics, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, etc (Hattari et al., 2008).   In the most 
recent decade, Singapore has shifted from low end manufacturing toward research, 
innovation, banking and financial investments (Sung 2006).  Kee and Hoon (2005) argue that 
the rapid economic development of Singapore may be partly attributed to these policies.       
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In 2003, foreign equity investment stocks (inbound direct plus portfolio investment 
stocks)
1 exceeded the corresponding outbound investment stocks by a margin of over 4 to 1, 
as noted in Figure 1.   Further, two-way investment between industrialized countries and 
Singapore exceeded that between developing countries and Singapore by more than 3 to 1.  
Most inbound investment comes from industrialized countries while most outbound 
investment goes to developing countries. Again, it is plausible that increasing relative 
Singapore skill endowments underlay the increase in outbound investment stocks, especially 
in developing countries.   
Singapore poses an interesting study of the influence of skills on foreign investment 
because of its unique and dynamic nature.  Singapore is no longer a developing country and 
it presents an interesting study of how foreign investment patterns change with economic 
development.  It went from a small, labor-abundant developing nation in the mid-1970s to a 
larger, though still small (in terms of GDP), skill-abundant NIC today.  In consequence, the 
nature of its inward foreign investment should have shifted from a labor-seeking orientation 
to a skill-seeking orientation.  Meanwhile, its investment in developing nations should reflect 
a growing labor-seeking motive as international firms seek low-cost manufacturing locations 
to service from regional headquarters.  We study these changes in this paper, through the 
prism of the knowledge-capital model.  
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we review the literature that 
motivates the analysis.  In Section 3 we specify the KK model for estimation and in Section 4 
                                                 
1 Data on foreign direct investment were only sporadically available before 1994 and hence foreign equity 
investment was used in this study.      
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we provide the econometric results.  In the final section we discuss the potential economic 
and policy significance of the findings and offer concluding remarks.   
2. The Knowledge-Capital Model and Prior Empirical Literature 
  Since Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984), the general-equilibrium theory of the 
multinational enterprise has focused on two distinct motivations for foreign direct investment 
(FDI): to access markets in order to circumvent trade frictions (horizontal FDI) and to 
employ low-wage labor for assembly parts of the production process (vertical FDI, or 
fragmentation).  In the former case, multiple plants making similar goods are located in 
different markets and produce either for local markets or regional exports.  In the latter, 
headquarters are split from assembly, and goods are traded in different stages of fabrication.   
2a. Theoretical Overview 
  These motivations may be understood consistently within the general-equilibrium 
knowledge-capital model of FDI, explicated in Markusen (2002).  The KK approach includes 
three principal assumptions.  First, services of knowledge-based activities, such as R&D, can 
be geographically separated from production and supplied to production facilities at low cost.  
Second, these knowledge-intensive activities are skilled-labor intensive relative to production.  
These assumptions create a motive for the vertical fragmentation of production, locating R&D 
activities where skilled labor is abundant and production where unskilled labor is plentiful.  
There will also be a motive for locating production in large markets if there are plant-level 
scale economies.   
  Third, knowledge-based services have a (partial) joint-input characteristic, in that they 
can be utilized simultaneously by multiple production facilities.  The third assumption creates 
firm-level scale economies and motivates horizontal investments that replicate the same     
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products or services in different locations.  
  The model assumes two homogeneous goods (X and Y), two countries (h and f), and 
two homogeneous factors, unskilled labor (L) and skilled labor (S), which are internationally 
immobile.  Good Y is labor-intensive and produced under constant returns to scale in a 
competitive industry.  Good X is skilled-labor-intensive overall, has increasing returns to scale 
at the plant level, and is subject to Cournot competition with free entry and exit.  Within a firm, 
headquarters services and plant facilities may be geographically separated and a firm may have 
plants in one or both countries.  Because R&D services can be shared across plants, sector X 
exhibits firm-level economies of scale as well.  Transport costs in trade use unskilled labor and 
there are fixed costs of investing in a new plant.   
  With this structure, there are several firm types that can arise in equilibrium.  First, 
there may be national firms that maintain a single plant and headquarters in one country and 
may or may not export to the other. Second, there may be horizontal MNEs that maintain 
plants in both countries with headquarters located in one country.  Finally, there may be 
vertical MNEs that maintain a single plant in one country and headquarters in the other.   
  Different country characteristics favor various firm types producing or maintaining 
headquarters in either country.  For example, national firms will be more likely in country h 
if it is relatively large, which encourages local production while firms would avoid 
investment costs in the smaller nation.  National firms also dominate if the two nations are 
similar in size and relative endowments, tending to discourage vertical FDI, and transport 
costs are low or foreign investment barriers are high, reducing horizontal investment.     
  Horizontal MNEs become important if the nations are similar in size and relative 
endowments, transport costs are high and investment costs are low.  In this environment     
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firms find it advantageous to locate production capacity in both locations, taking advantage 
of firm-level scale economies, while selling primarily in local markets to avoid transport 
costs.  However, if the countries vary in endowments but have similar size firms, MNEs 
would concentrate headquarters in the skilled-labor-abundant country and production in the 
skilled-labor-scarce country.  Thus vertical firms headquartered in the skilled-labor-abundant 
countries are favored unless trade costs are high.  Vertical MNEs become especially 
significant if one country is small and skilled-labor abundant, in which case headquarters 
locate there and produce in the other location.  This incentive is increased if trade costs from 
the host country back to the parent country are low.   
2b. Application to Singapore 
We apply this model informally to Singapore in order to motivate our regression 
analysis.  Throughout the period of analysis, Singapore, despite experiencing rapid economic 
growth, remained small in terms of its own market size (domestic consumption) in 
comparison with the other countries in our sample.  However, the economy dramatically 
increased its relative skill endowments.  For example, Figure 2 depicts trends over time in 
relative skill differences between Singapore and selected industrialized countries (the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands).
2  The 
downward trend in each case reflects increases in Singapore’s endowment of occupational 
skills relative to the partner nation.  Specifically, the skills gap between Singapore and its 
industrialized investment partners began to fall in the late 1980s, with more dramatic falls 
occurring in the early 1990s.  Indeed, by this measure Germany, the Netherlands and 
Australia became scarce in such skills compared to Singapore over the period, while the gap 
                                                 
2 We define this measure of skill differences in the next section.     
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between U.S. and UK skills, on the one hand, and Singapore, on the other, fell sharply.  
Singapore also built an increasing skill gap relative to the developing economies in our 
sample. 
Thus, throughout our period Singapore was small in size but shifted its endowment 
ratio from being labor-abundant to skill-abundant, even with respect to many of the 
industrialized countries.  This development path should then be reflected in the data from a 
positive impact of skill differences on inward investment early in our period, reflecting the 
tendency of foreign investment to seek low-cost labor in Singapore.  Put differently, a rise in 
Singapore’s skill ratio would diminish incentives for vertical investment, which would not be 
offset by a gain in horizontal investment incentives.  However, late in the period inward 
foreign investment from industrialized partners should expand with a rise in Singapore’s skill 
endowment because that investment would be skill-seeking in nature.  
As an initial study, Figure 3 shows the growth of inward FEI stocks from the same set 
of industrialized countries over the period.  In all cases, as skill differences decreased 
investment in Singapore expanded, but this increase accelerated late in the period.   
2c. Prior Estimation 
In CMM (2001) the initial empirical estimation of the KK model was performed, 
using a 1986-1994 panel dataset of bilateral country-level affiliate sales in manufacturing, 
involving both U.S. affiliates abroad and foreign affiliates in the United States.  In their 
econometric work, the authors found that a convergence in income (GDP) between the 
United States and any investment partner (holding the sum of their incomes constant) 
increased affiliate sales in both directions.  There was substantially greater evidence of 
horizontal FDI, with affiliate sales rising in host countries with skill endowments closer to     
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those of the United States, than of vertical FDI.  This result may have been due to the 
selection of countries, which did not include many lower-income developing nations.   
This empirical evidence has been substantiated by other studies.  Gao (2003) included 
an additional variable to account for ethnic networks and found that there is a significantly 
positive role in inward FDI of ethnic Chinese networks.  Waldkirch (2008) studied German 
MNEs and found that FDI happens largely between similarly endowed countries, with little 
evidence of any vertical motivation.  Braconier, Norback and Urban (2005) included other 
industrialized countries, such as Sweden, and found evidence to support the KK model.   
An important criticism of the CMM approach was that pooling bilateral data could 
disguise the actual relationships between endowment differences and MNE activity.  The 
reason is that the United States was the host in half the observations and the parent in the 
rest, implying that the sign of their skill-endowments variable (the difference between parent 
and host in the ratio of skilled to total labor) depended on the direction of the investment.  
Thus, where the United States was a skill-abundant host (parent), an increase in skill 
differences implied a convergence (divergence) in endowments.  This difference makes 
interpretation of coefficients difficult and calls for splitting the sample into inward and 
outward investment (Blonigen, Davies and Head, 2003; Blonigen, 2005).  
A second criticism of such studies is the potentially inappropriate pooling of data 
from developing and industrialized countries.  Blonigen and Wang (2004) found that the 
underlying factors affecting the location of FDI activity varied systematically across these 
country groups in a way that was not captured by prior empirical models.  Thus, U.S. 
outward FDI to large industrialized countries is strongly attracted to countries with higher     
  11
skill abundance, suggesting a horizontal motivation.  However, the effect was reversed for 
FDI in developing countries, although the relationship was not statistically significant.
3   
As Blonigen and Wang’s (2004) criticism would suggest, a drawback of the earlier 
studies is that, except for Gao (2003), they did not consider data for specific developing 
countries or NICs, such as Singapore.   Furthermore, many multinationals base themselves in 
Singapore and invest in neighboring developing countries, and hence there is a need to take 
into account the market size of the entire ASEAN region.  In principle, application of the KK 
model to Singapore is both novel and appropriate, because during the period of analysis the 
country made a transition from attracting labor-intensive foreign investment to acquiring 
skill-intensive foreign investment.  Furthermore, as MNEs use Singapore as regional 
headquarters to invest in neighboring countries, the use of ASEAN GDP to account for host 
market size is appropriate for inbound foreign investment.  As this research incorporates both 
these investment objectives, a panel study of two-way foreign investmne into and out of 
Singapore taking into consideration the impact of the regional market size should be of 
considerable interest.  In addition, we also incorporate the role of the GOS in maintaining 
political stability, strict anti-corruption laws as well as the development of infrastructure such 
as roads, rails, energy, telecommunications and ports. 
3.  Empirical Framework and Data 
  Here we specify the econometric approach that represents the KK model and address 
a number of questions.  We then describe our dataset, which was developed specifically for 
this analysis and seems unique in its comprehensive coverage of a panel of two-way FDI 
                                                 
3 See also Yeaple (2003).     
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stocks for a country in transition from labor abundance and low incomes to skill abundance 
and high incomes. 
3a. Basic Specification 
The KK model provides an econometric specification, grounded in theory, for 
explaining the general determinants of foreign investment activities.  It is sufficiently flexible 
to permit the data to reveal, indirectly, whether investment into and out of Singapore is 
driven by factor-cost (vertical) motivations, market-seeking (horizontal) motivations, or both.  
Following CMM, our initial specification is as follows:  
FEIijt = β0 + β1 (GDPit +GDPjt) + β2 (GDPit –GDPjt)
2 + β3 (SKit – SKjt) 
+β4 (GDPit –GDPjt) * (SKit – SKjt) + β5 ICjt + β6 INSTjt + β7 INFRAjt + β8 TCjt + β9 TCjt * 
(SKit – SKjt)
2+ β10 TCit + β11 DISTij+ eijt       ( 1 )  
  In this specification the dependent variable is the stock of foreign equity investment 
(FEI) invested by country i (the parent) in country j (the host).
4  For inward investment, 
Singapore is always the host country and for outward investment Singapore is always the 
parent country.  CMM (2001) employed majority-owned affiliate sales in manufacturing as 
their measure of FDI activity.  This measure is not available for Singapore for the period 
1984-2003, and hence we choose to analyze investment stocks instead.  Note that focusing on 
stocks instead of activity flows may actually be an advantage, for the former measures reflect 
long-term decisions to invest and are less volatile, and less dependent on omitted variables, 
than are annual activity measures (Braconier, Norback and Urban, 2005). 
The first right-hand side variable is the sum of parent-country and host-country real 
gross domestic product, which we label GDP Sum.  It captures joint market size and the 
                                                 
4 Definitions of variables and data sources are provided in the following subsection.     
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coefficient is expected to be positive.  The next variable is the squared difference in GDP 
between parent and host nations.  These differences capture changes in relative size, holding 
relative factor endowments fixed, and the theory implies that incentives for market-seeking 
investment should increase as countries become more similar in size.  Thus, in principle there 
should be an inverted U-shaped relationship between FEI stock and country size differences, 
suggesting that the coefficient should have a negative sign.   
As noted above, one difficulty with this interpretation is that Singapore is small 
relative to the other countries in the data.  When one partner is small, the underlying 
theoretical discrimination between horizontal and vertical motivations is less sharp and it is 
possible to observe a positive coefficient on size differences.  This might be particularly true 
early in the period of Singapore’s growth when it was relatively more labor-abundant.  
The next variable is the difference in relative skill endowments between the parent 
and host countries.  This is a central variable in the KK model for its potential to identify 
differences in investment motivations.  Thus, if the parent country is skill-abundant and the 
recipient country is abundant in lower-skilled labor, an increase in skill differences should 
raise incentives for vertical FEI, or fragmentation, implying a positive coefficient.  However, 
if countries are relatively similar in their endowments, supporting horizontal incentives for 
FEI, an increase in this difference would tend to diminish investment, generating a negative 
coefficient.  Finally, if the recipient nation is skill-abundant, implying that the skill 
differences variable is negative, a rise in its endowment would attract skill-seeking FEI.  In 
that case the coefficient would be negative.  The interaction between country-size differences 
and skilled labor differences is expected to have a negative impact since FEI stocks should be     
  14
smaller where market size differences are large, for a given difference in skills.  This variable 
is designed to capture some of the non-linearities implicit in the KK model. 
The variable ICjt captures the costs of investing in the host country, whether that is 
Singapore for inbound FEI stocks or partner nations for outbound FEI stocks.  Higher host-
country investment costs should reduce investment.  The variable INSTjt captures the 
institutional barriers in Singapore for inward FEI and partner nations for outbound FEI. 
Higher host country institutional barriers should reduce investment.  Similarly INFRAjt 
captures the infrastructure barriers in the host country and should have a negative impact on 
FEI.  The next variable, TCjt is a measure of trade costs (import restrictions) in the host 
country.  To the extent that investment is driven by market-seeking incentives, higher host-
country trade costs should increase it due to tariff-jumping.  However, where investment is 
undertaken to fragment production networks, higher trade costs can deter FEI.  Finally, 
parent-nation trade costs (TCit) should have a negative impact on FEI stocks since they make 
exporting output back home more costly.  The interaction term between host-country trade 
costs and squared skill differences is designed to capture the fact that such costs should 
encourage horizontal, but not vertical, investment, in which case they should matter less 
when skill differences are large.  But, as CMM (2001) point out, this is not a theoretically 
sharp hypothesis.  Finally, DISTij is the distance in kilometers between Singapore and the 
capital cities of partner countries.  Generally, one would anticipate a negative coefficient on 
this variable. 
While coefficient β3 captures the direct marginal impact of skill differences on 
investment stocks, the total marginal effect depends on other economic determinants, as 
suggested by the non-linearities captured in interaction terms.  For example, if β4 is negative     
  15
and the parent country is larger than the host, a reduction in the difference in country size 
(that is, an increase in the size of the host) should reduce the sensitivity of investment stocks 
to skill differences.  In terms of our application, if over time Singapore (as host) grows in 
size relative to parent investors, the relationship between Singapore skill differences and 
investment stocks should get smaller or become negative, reflecting a shift in incentives 
away from vertical to horizontal FEI.   
  This basic framework is applied to data samples involving both inbound and 
outbound FEI stocks in Singapore.   This estimation should capture the basic influences of 
the KK model.  However, we also split the sample into inbound and outbound separately for 
industrialized-country and developing-country partners and investigate foreign investment 
behavior for these groups separately.  For inbound investment from industrialized countries, 
the motivation is expected to shift over time from labor-seeking to skill-seeking.  Investment 
by developing countries in Singapore is small, coming mostly from neighboring ASEAN 
countries and India and China, compared to Singapore’s corresponding outbound investment.  
Hence, outbound investment from Singapore to developing countries is expected to be 
predominantly vertical, while we have no particular expectation about inbound investment.     
  As noted in Figure 2, Singapore rapidly increased its share of skilled occupations in 
its labor force in the 1980s and 1990s, to the point where it became skill-abundant relative to 
many of its industrialized country partners even as foreign investment continued to increase 
(Figure 3).  This implies that the skill-difference variable shifted from being positive to 
negative for a number of parent countries investing in Singapore over the period.  In itself, 
this fact is consistent with the rapid development of the country shifting incentives away 
from low-wage investment to skill-seeking investment.  To capture this possibility we also     
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split the sample into two groups, first the observations from 1984 to 1987 and second those 
from 1988 to 2003.  This sample split is based on an inspection of the skills data contained in 
the next subsection.   
3b. Data Sources and Description 
The dependent variable in the KK model should be a measure of bilateral stocks of 
FDI.  Unfortunately, Singapore only sporadically compiled outbound and inbound FDI data 
for some countries in the sample before 1994.  Information from 1984-2003 is available on 
bilateral stocks of foreign equity investment (FEI), defined as the sum of direct equity 
investment and portfolio equity investment.  Direct equity investment incorporates all 
investments made in ownership entailing a measure of management control, with a minimum 
ownership threshold of ten percent, while portfolio investment involves financial stakes 
unrelated to management control.  Thus, the measure we analyze, FEI stocks, is somewhat 
broader than FDI.  However, in Singapore portfolio investment is relatively small.  Stocks of 
such investment amounted to no more than 9.5 percent of total FEI stocks from 1994 to 2003 
and averaged less than 4.0 percent.  Moreover, the correlation between FEI stocks and FDI 
stocks from 1994 through 2003 is 0.929.  We employ data on investment stocks in all sectors, 
which include manufacturing and services, and in total manufacturing.  The sources of the 
FEI data are the Statistical Yearbook of Singapore, Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore 
and Singapore’s Investment Abroad, published by the Department of Statistics, GOS.  They 
are converted into millions of 1990 US dollars using contemporaneous exchange rates and 
the US GDP deflator.   
  Data on the right-hand side variables come from sources detailed in CMM (2001), 
updated through 2003.  Real GDP is measured in billions of 1990 US dollars for each country.      
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Annual real GDP figures in local currency were converted into dollars using the market 
exchange rate. Both GDP and exchange rate data are from the International Financial Statistics 
of the IMF.  Skilled labor abundance is defined as the sum of occupational categories 0/1 
(professional, technical, and kindred workers) and 2 (administrative workers) in employment in 
each country, divided by total employment.  These figures are compiled from annual surveys 
reported in the Yearbook of Labor Statistics published by the International Labor Organization.  
In cases where some annual figures were missing, the skilled-labor ratios were taken to equal 
the period averages for each country.  Our skill difference variable is the relative skill 
endowment of the parent country less that of the host country. 
  The cost of investing in the affiliate country is a simple average of several indices of 
perceived impediments to investment, reported in the World Competitiveness Report (1986-
1994) and Global Competitiveness Report (1995-2003) of the World Economic Forum.  The 
investment barriers include restrictions on the ability to acquire control in a domestic company, 
limitations on the ability to employ foreign skilled labor, restraints on negotiating joint 
ventures, strict controls on hiring and firing practices, market dominance by a small number of 
enterprises, an absence of fair administration of justice, difficulties in acquiring local bank 
credit, restrictions on access to local and foreign capital markets, and inadequate protection of 
intellectual property.  The resulting indices are computed on a scale from zero to 100, with a 
higher number indicating higher investment costs.  The institutional barriers are defined as the 
frequency of bribery and corruption in the host country and are computed on a scale from zero 
to 100 with zero being the least corrupt and 100 being the most corrupt. Meanwhile, the 
infrastructure barriers refers to the quality of infrastructure in the host country and includes the 
quality of railroad, ports, air transport, waterways, roads, electric supply as well as telecoms     
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and telephones.  They are also computed on a scale of zero to 100 with zero being the most 
efficient and 100 being the least efficient.  Finally, the trade-cost index is taken from the same 
source and is defined as a measure of national protectionism, or efforts to prevent importation 
of competitive products.  It also runs from zero to 100, with 100 being the highest trade costs.  
All of these indices are based on extensive surveys of MNE managers.  Finally, distance is the 
number of kilometers of each country's capital city from Singapore.   
  The number of countries and years included for manufacturing (1994-2003) is lower 
than that of the full sample (1984-2003).
 5  The full sample was also estimated for the period 
1994-2003 using the same countries as in the manufacturing sample for comparison purposes.  
As discussed earlier, the substantial improvement in Singapore’s skill base and investment 
climate should have raised the incentives of MNEs to locate regional headquarters there, from 
which to increase outward vertical FEI.   
  Summary statistics on all variables are available on request.  To overview them, 
industrialized countries make up about 2/3 of the sample.  Overall total outbound FEI stocks to 
developing countries were far higher than the reverse activity.  In contrast, total inbound FEI 
stocks from industrialized countries were much higher than Singapore’s outbound FEI to those 
nations.  Average FEI stocks were considerably larger after 1988 than before in both directions.  
It is important to note that there are a number of years early in the period where either inward 
or outward investment stocks were reported to be zero, almost always with developing 
countries.  Thus, our estimation procedure is Tobit. 
                                                 
5  The countries included in the full sample (1984-2003) are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, USA, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Thailand.  There were no manufacturing FEI data for South Africa.  For India, 
data were available only after 1998. Hence both countries are excluded from the 1994-2003 analysis.     
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3c. Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables  
It is evident that causation may run both ways between skill differences, which is our 
primary determinant of interest, and foreign investment.  For example, an increase in inbound 
FEI may raise the level of skills in Singapore due to professional training within MNEs.  
Moreover, flows of investment may be accompanied by the transfer of skilled engineers and 
managers within the firm between countries.  Thus, the skill-differences variable is likely to 
be endogenous to investment to some degree.  To address this issue we develop instruments 
that plausibly are correlated with skill differences but not correlated with the regression error 
term.   
We incorporate two classes of instruments.  First is the vector of labor force 
participation rates for males and females in the partner country, which we take from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  The idea is that as the prevalence of skills 
rises, labor participation increases for both males and females. Thus, for French investment 
in Singapore these instruments are the labor participation rates for males and females in 
France, whereas for Singapore’s investment in India it is the corresponding Indian labor force 
participation rates.   
A second class of instruments relates to labor-market conditions abroad.  For 
regressions involving bilateral FEI stocks between Singapore and the industrialized 
economies we employ the contemporaneous unemployment rates in China and the 
Philippines.   The idea is that changes in aggregate labor demand in those countries should be 
correlated with labor-market conditions, including occupational mix, in Singapore and the 
developed economies, but should be exogenous to decisions to change their bilateral FEI 
stocks.  Similarly, for bilateral skill-ratio differences between Singapore and the developing     
  20
economies our instrument is the average unemployment rate of OECD countries, which is 
available from an on-line OECD database.
6  The citizens of these countries also have options 
to go to other countries such as the US, UK or Australia if unemployment rates remain high.  
But, countries such as the US, UK and Australia have quotas on foreign talent while 
Singapore does not.  Hence, it is appropriate to use unemployment rates in OECD countries, 
and China and the Philippines as instrumental variables. The Chinese unemployment rate is 
available from the People’s Republic of China Statistical Yearbook and the Philippines 
unemployment rate is available from the Philippines Yearbook of Statistics. 
3d. Regional FDI Activities 
One notable feature that helps explain the structure of foreign investment is that 
MNEs often establish an affiliate in Singapore and then use it as a base to invest in 
neighboring developing countries (Low, Ramstetter and Yeung, 1998).  Examples of such 
corporations are presented in the Annex.  Outward investment by foreign-controlled firms 
was around 60 percent of total outward investment during 1995, declining to 40 percent by 
1998.
7   It declined further to 35 percent by 2003 due to waves of mergers and consolidations 
in which Singapore based corporations purchased majority stakes in foreign firms operating 
in Singapore
8.  To check the robustness of the results using Singapore GDP, and to account 
for the ASEAN market size, we also use ASEAN GDP to account for regional investment 
activities for both manufacturing and aggregate investment. Specifically, the variables 
                                                 
6 OECD. http://www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_495670_1_1_1_1_1,00.html  
Paris: OECD. 
7 Department of Statistics, Government of Singapore 
8 Department of Statistics, Government of Singapore     
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GDPSUM and the square of GDP differences would change to account for ASEAN GDP.  
For skill differences interacted with GDP differences, we would use ASEAN GDP interacted 
with skill differences between Singapore and its investment partners. Meanwhile all other 
variables remain the same as the basic specification.  Here, we focus only on inbound 
investment from industrialized countries.   
Annual real GDP figures for ASEAN
9 in local currencies were converted into dollars 
using the market exchange rate.  Both ASEAN GDP and exchange rates are from the 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF.   
4. Econometric Results 
  We first apply the basic framework to the inbound and outbound FEI data for all 
sectors (manufacturing plus services)
 10 and countries.  We then repeat the analysis for 
manufacturing separately. The available data series on FEI stocks in manufacturing only 
begins in 1994, and hence those regressions cover just the latter half of the period.    
Our instrumental-variables procedure is to run the first-stage regressions of relative 
skill differences on the instrumental variables discussed above for each sample and use the 
predicted values to estimate second-stage Tobit regressions.  With few exceptions, the Sargan 
test indicated that the variables are uncorrelated with the residuals and serve as appropriate 
instruments.
 11  The first-stage equations are available upon request.   
4a. Basic Specification 
                                                 
9 Sum of the GDPs  of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos. Time series data for Myanmar and Brunei Darrusalam were not available for all years and hence were 
excluded fromt the ASEAN GDP. 
10 Mining and agriculture are extremely small sectors in Singapore and no FEI data are reported for them. 
11 A Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions is used to test for the validity of instruments. The instruments 
adopted are generally considered valid if the p value is greater than 0.1.     
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The first column of Table 1 presents second-stage Tobit regression results for 
aggregate inbound FEI stocks in Singapore for the period 1984-2003, while the second 
column presents the results for aggregate outbound stocks.  Table 2 (columns 2 and 4) 
presents the corresponding results for manufacturing inbound and outbound FEI (1994-2003) 
while columns 1 and 3 present the results for aggregate inbound and outbound FEI for the 
same period.  During the 1984-2003 period, the effect of joint market size on inbound 
investment, measured by the sum of GDP, is positive though insignificant but the coefficient 
on squared difference in real GDP is positive and significant, the latter not the expected 
outcome under the KK model.  For 1994-2003 (Table 2), the squared difference in real GDP 
is also positive though insignificant for aggregate inbound stocks.  However, the 
corresponding coefficient for inward manufacturing investment in the second column of 
Table 2 is negative (though also insignificant) as expected under the KK model.  These 
findings suggest that there is a notable difference between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing as regards inbound FEI stocks.  Inbound manufacturing investments follow 
the inverted-U shape in size differences, but aggregate inbound investments seem to rise with 
differences in GDP suggesting that non-manufacturing investments do so as well.  It may be 
that larger parent countries, such as the United States and Japan, are more likely to invest 
disproportionately in non-manufacturing sectors as their GDP rises.  Also in Table 1 and 2, 
we find that outbound aggregate and manufacturing investment from Singapore rises in 
market size and falls in GDP size differences, as anticipated.  
The investment-cost, trade-cost and infrastructure barrier indexes in the host country 
are insignificant for aggregate and manufacturing inbound FEI stocks.  Meanwhile, the 
institutional barrier index for Singapore is negative and significant at the five percent level     
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for the 1984-2003 aggregate and manufacturing samples suggesting that government policy 
to promote stability and actions against bribery and corruption over time makes the country 
attractive for investment.  However, the direct impacts of investment costs as well as 
institutional and infrastructure barriers in outbound aggregate investment and outbound 
manufacturing investment achieve the expected signs and are significantly different from 
zero.  Thus, Singapore’s aggregate investment abroad as well as in manufacturing avoids 
higher investment costs as well as higher institutional and infrastructure barriers.  Meanwhile 
for aggregate and manufacturing outbound investment, trade costs of the host countries are 
insignificant while the trade cost of the parent is negative and significant at the one percent 
level, for the former only.  Finally, distance does not have much of an impact on inbound 
stocks.  It however significantly reduces aggregate outbound and manufacturing investment. 
Our main interest lies in the impact of relative skill endowments.  The direct 
coefficients on relative skill differences, specified as the parent country’s share of skilled 
occupations in the labor force minus the corresponding figure for the host country, are 
negative and significant at the five percent level for the 1984-2003 aggregate inbound 
samples.  They are also negative and significant at the five percent level for the aggregate 
1994-2003 inbound sample and insignificant for the manufacturing inbound samples.  This 
suggests that although inbound manufacturing investment increases with a relative increase 
in Singapore skills it is not sensitive to changes in skill differences. However, skill 
differences are significantly positive in all outbound regressions, suggesting that an increase 
in Singapore’s skills compared to the countries in which it invests tends to increase FEI 
stocks.  Singapore’s outbound investment has largely gone to developing countries and in 
that sample the skill-differences variable is always positive.  Thus, an increase in this     
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variable would suggest a rising relative skill endowment in Singapore, which induces a rise 
in both aggregate and manufacturing outbound FEI stocks.  This finding supports the view 
that Singapore’s investment abroad is concentrated in labor-intensive assembly 
manufacturing, particularly later in the period.   
As noted earlier, the total impact of skill differences depends also on the interaction 
coefficients.  Thus, the average annual impact of changes in FEI stocks as a result of changes 
in skill differences is derived as follows: 
∂FEI/∂(SKit – SKjt)= β3+ β4 (GDPit –GDPjt)+ 2*β9 (TCit * (SKit – SKjt))   
 (2)   
The interaction between GDP differences and skill differences for 1984-2003 is negative and 
significant for both aggregate inbound FEI as well as manufacturing FEI.   Plugging in the 
means for the entire aggregate inbound sample in Table 1 into equation (2), we get the 
following result:   
∂FEI/∂(SKit – SKjt)=-10169 -0.0068(1032861) + 2*(8.68)(18.1205*-0.07393) =  
-US$ 18142.4 million 
Over the 1984-2003 period, as host Singapore became skill abundant relative to all parent 
countries in our sample, average inbound FEI stocks from these countries increased by US$ 
18.14 billion annually.  Singapore’s increasing skill abundance over the time period relative 
to all parent countries accounted for 41% of average aggregate inbound FEI stocks from 
these countries in our sample. For most of the period the GDP of all parent countries was 
always larger than Singapore’s, making the GDP difference variable mostly positive.  
Compared to the industrialized countries Singapore was relatively scarce in skills early in the 
period.  Thus, an increase in skill differences was a divergence in endowments, tending to     
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diminish incentives for market-seeking investment for a given relative size, consistent with 
the full-period total FEI sample.  Later in the period Singapore became skill abundant, even 
compared to most industrialized parent countries, and a rise in skill differences would imply 
a convergence in skills and a tendency to increase skill-seeking FEI, consistent with the 
manufacturing-sample coefficient on inbound stocks.  Note that the interaction terms 
between the square of skill differences and host country trade costs for inbound FEI stocks 
 (Table 1) are negative, though insignificant.   Finally, for outbound stocks, as parent 
Singapore became skill abundant relative to all host countries in our sample, average 
outbound FEI stocks to these countries increased by US$ 5.51 billion annually.  Singapore’s 
increasing skill abundance over the time period relative to all host countries accounted for 
40% of average aggregate outbound FEI stocks to these countries in our sample. 
Table 3 offers a different cut of the data by considering aggregate inbound and 
outbound FEI stocks broken down into investment with industrialized and developing 
countries.  The first and second columns list results for aggregate data with developing 
countries and the third and fourth columns for industrialized countries.  Variations in joint 
market size positively affect inbound FEI stocks to and from developing countries, while this 
variable is not significant for industrialized nations.  The coefficients on squared differences 
in GDP are positive for inbound investment from industrialized countries, consistent with the 
result for aggregate inbound FEI in Table 1 (column 1) but negative for developing countries, 
the latter consistent with the KK model.   
The primary difference between bilateral investment with industrialized and developing 
countries arises in the coefficients on skill differences.  The direct impact on inbound and 
                                                 
12 All the equations in Tables 3 and 4 were re-estimated using absolute skill values but the result did not change.     
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outbound FEI is negative in the case of industrialized partners, a result that we explore 
further below.  In contrast, this coefficient is significantly positive for both inbound and 
outbound investment with developing countries, indicating that this investment has a vertical 
orientation.  As Singapore’s skill endowments rose compared to those in neighboring 
developing economies, outbound FEI stocks grew larger.  The results are similar for inbound 
stocks from developing countries, where all skill-differences data observations are negative.  
Here, an increase in skill endowment in a developing-country host would reduce this 
negative skill difference.  The positive coefficient implies that inward FEI in Singapore from 
such countries would increase, meaning that as they become more skill abundant relative to 
Singapore they invest more in the latter. However, it should be remembered that inbound 
investment stocks from developing countries to Singapore are small and confined mostly to 
ASEAN member countries and more recently India and China. 
More insight may be gained by computing total derivatives of inbound FEI stocks, valued at 
the sample means of all variables in 1994 (the mid-year of the sample), and taking account of 
the sign of skill differences for each industrialized country investment partners in Table 3.  
Plugging in these values in equation (2) we find the following results:  first, over the sample 
period an increase in Singapore’s skilled labor abundance relative to the parent country 
increased total inbound FEI stocks from all industrialized countries and vice versa.  
Regarding investment from industrialized countries, it is notable that parent firms in these 
countries have invested significantly in skill-intensive activities in Singapore and also have 
located regional headquarters facilities there.  In addition, regarding investment from 
developing countries, a rise in Singapore’s skill abundance relative to China marginally 
increases inbound FEI stocks from China.  The latter result reflects the importance of size as 
well as relative skill endowments, for enterprises in large developing countries find it 
advantageous to locate their skill-intensive operations in Singapore.  Our result suggests that 
as Singapore becomes even more skill-abundant, for given GDP levels, Chinese enterprises 
invest even more there. For specific countries, over the sample period an increase in parent-
country Singapore’s skilled-labor abundance relative to that of host countries increased 
outbound FEI stocks to all developing countries in the sample.   
Table 4 offers a similar cut of the data by considering manufacturing inbound and outbound 
FEI stocks broken down into investment with industrialized and developing countries.  The 
first and second columns list results for manufacturing data with developing countries and 
the third and fourth columns for industrialized countries.  Unlike the aggregate sample, 
variations in joint market size and the squared GDP differences are insignificant for FEI 
stocks to and from industrialized and developing countries.   
The primary difference between bilateral investment with industrialized and developing 
countries arises in the coefficients on skill differences.  The direct impact on inbound and 
outbound FEI is negative in the case of industrialized partners, although in the case of 
inbound stocks insignificant.  In contrast, this coefficient is significantly positive for both 
inbound and outbound manufacturing investment with developing countries, indicating that 
this investment has a vertical orientation.  As Singapore’s skill endowments rose compared to 
those in neighboring developing economies, outbound manufacturing FEI stocks grew larger.      
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The results are similar for inbound stocks, where the skill-difference variable is also positive 
and significant at the one percent level.  The positive coefficient implies that inward FEI in 
Singapore from such countries would increase indicating that as they become more skill 
abundant relative to Singapore they invest more in the latter.  Finally, the results presented in 
Table 4 should be interpreted with caution as the manufacturing samples for bilateral 
investment with both industrialized and developing countries are small. 
Section 4(b). Re-specifying the GDP variable to account for ASEAN Market Size 
As discussed earlier, MNEs also invest in Singapore to re-invest in neighboring developing 
countries.  For instance, MNEs establish regional headquarters in Singapore and re-invest in 
neighboring countries such as Indonesia.  Thus, MNEs investing in Singapore are also likely 
to take into consideration the entire market size of the ASEAN region.  To account for the 
ASEAN market size, and to establish the robustness of the results using the Singapore market 
size discussed earlier, we recast the market size variable to include the regional FDI 
activities. We re-estimate the industrialized country inbound equations separately by using 
the ASEAN GDP measures to account for regional FDI activities.  
Second-stage Tobit regression results for aggregate inbound FEI stocks in Singapore from 
industrialized countries using ASEAN GDP for the period 1984-2003 are 
presented in the first column of Table 5, while 
the corresponding results for 1994-2003  and 
manufacturing FEI from industrialized 
countries for the same period  are presented 
in columns 2 and 3 respectively.  Regarding 
aggregate inbound FEI from industrialized 
countries for the period 1984-2003, GDP Sum 
is insignificant while the coefficient on real 
GDP difference squared is positive and 
significant, not the expected outcome under 
the KK model.  Meanwhile, for the aggregate 
1994-2003 sample, the GDP Sum is positive and 
significant while the squared difference in 
real GDP is positive but insignificant.  For 
inbound manufacturing investment, however, 
the corresponding coefficients presented in 
the third column are insignificant.  
The host country investment cost is 
insignificant in all equations.  However, the 
improvements in institutions significantly 
increase aggregate and manufacturing FEI into 
Singapore. Finally, there is one major 
difference between the results for the 
aggregate sample with Singapore GDP 
presented in Tables 1 and 2 and the aggregate inbound industrialized country sample with     
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ASEAN GDP presented in Table 5. Distance has a positive and significant impact on 
inbound aggregate and manufacturing stocks when ASEAN GDP is used suggesting that 
countries further away invest more heavily in Singapore than those that are nearer.  This may 
indicate that MNEs from distant countries such as the US and the UK are more likely to 
invest heavily in Singapore to have an easier access to markets in the ASEAN region by 
avoiding higher transport costs.  
Regarding skill endowments, the direct coefficients on Singapore’s relative skill differences 
are negative and significant at the five percent level for both the 1984-2003 and 1994-2003 
samples.   They are positive but insignificant for the manufacturing inbound samples.  This 
may be because Singapore is attracting both high end and low end manufacturing investment.  
While high end manufacturing investment stays on in Singapore, the low end investment 
passes through Singapore on its way to neighboring countries.  During 2003 manufacturing 
accounted for about forty percent of all outbound investment (manufacturing plus non-
manufacturing investment) by foreign MNEs with regional headquarters in Singapore, 
 mostly to neighboring countries .  However, although non-manufacturing investment to 
neighboring countries by foreign MNEs accounted for sixty percent of all investment, 
inbound non-manufacturing investment stocks from industrialized countries were nearly 
three times the manufacturing investment. This clearly indicates that a majority of the 
inbound non-manufacturing investment stays on in Singapore while majority of the 
manufacturing investment coming into Singapore is re-invested in neighboring countries.  
For aggregate inbound FEI, the interaction between GDP differences and skill differences is 
negative and significant for 1984-2003, but insignificant for manufacturing FEI.  For the 
1994-2003 period aggregate sample it is also insignificant, suggesting that this finding may 
be related to the time periods of the samples.  A reduction in the difference in size between 
the parent countries and ASEAN (ie., an increase in the size of ASEAN) reduces the 
sensitivity of investment stocks in Singapore to Singapore’s skill differences.  During the 
1980s and again during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, ASEAN was smaller in size 
relative to most parent industrialized countries. Over time as the ASEAN hosts, (with the 
exception of the 1997-98 period), grew in size relative to parent investors, the relationship 
between Singapore skill differences and inward investment stocks should get smaller or 
becomes negative (depending upon the partner country), ie., Singapore attracts more 
horizontal FEI.  Finally, the interaction terms between the square of skill differences and host 
 country trade costs are insignificant .   
More insight may be gained by computing total derivatives of FEI stocks using ASEAN GDP 
for inbound investment from industrialized countries, valued at the sample means of all 
variables in 1994 (the mid-year of the sample), and taking account of the sign of skill 
differences for particular industrial country investment partners in Table 5.  Plugging in these 
                                                 
13 Singapore Department of Statistics, 2003 
14 These equations were re-estimated using absolute skill values but did not change the basic results.     
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values into equation (2) we find the following result: over the sample period an increase in 
Singapore’s skilled labor abundance relative to the parent country increased total inbound 
FEI stocks from all industrialized countries.  
The basic results are reinforced by the regressions in Table 6, which break the aggregate 
inbound and industrialized country inbound samples into periods before and after 1988 
(1984-1987 and 1988-  2003).   As noted earlier, Singapore’s relative endowment of 
occupational skills rose rapidly in the mid- to late-1980s compared to the industrialized 
countries, with the relative difference tending to become negative (for Singapore as host) 
around 1988.  The implication of Table 6 seems clear.  Singapore’s inbound investment 
shifted from a vertical, labor-seeking orientation (positive coefficient on skill differences) to 
a more skill-seeking orientation (negative on skill difference and the interaction with GDP 
differences).  This finding is supported again by the breakdown of bilateral investment stocks 
with the industrialized countries (columns 3 and 4).  Here, once again the direct coefficient 
on skill differences switches from significantly positive to significantly negative.  In the latter 
case, a reduction in relative skill differences, which would imply an increase in Singapore’s 
skill endowment compared to the parent, would suggest a positive impact on inward FEI.   
Regression results for the outbound sample did not show any significant differences 
regarding the skill-differences variable between 1984-1987 and 1988-2003 periods and are 
not reported here.  As suggested by the regressions in Tables 1, 2 and 3, however, these 
coefficients were positive and significant in the full sample, suggesting that outbound 
investment in developing countries have been motivated by vertical incentives throughout the 
period.  Regression results controlling for the Asian financial crisis did not show any major 
impact.  Due to lack of many data points after SARS and 9/11 we did not empirically 
estimate their impacts. 
  Overall, the strikingly different results with respect to inward and outward 
multinational activity underscore that pooling these observations may mask the underlying 
relationships that vary between samples.  Singapore’s history with foreign investment 
suggests that its directional flows are induced by different factors, while there was a 
transition over the period of its inward investment from a labor-seeking to a skill-seeking 
motivation. 
5. Implications and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we analyzed the role of skill development on the activity of MNEs in terms of 
investment both into and out of Singapore.  The estimation is based on the knowledge-capital 
model, the foundation for a number of recent studies.  Most of those studies have focused on 
industrialized countries and ours is the first attempt to apply the model to a newly 
industrializing economy.  
The analysis presented here indicates that Singapore occupies an interesting position within 
within the context of the knowledge-capital model.  Singapore is small (though it grew 
                                                 
15 Because the manufacturing data only begin in 1994 it is not feasible to repeat this exercise on those stocks.     
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rapidly) and increased its supply of skilled labor in relation to nearly all countries in the 
sample over the 1984-2003 period.  These dynamics supported an evolution of direct 
investment into and out of Singapore that may be characterized as follows.  First, over time 
the nature of inward investment from the industrialized countries shifted sharply from a 
modestly vertical orientation toward a skill-seeking orientation.  Further, Singapore’s rapid 
growth in skill endowments supported a significant rise in horizontal outward FEI in the 
industrialized world.  Second, over the period Singapore’s skill share rose considerably in 
relation to those in neighboring developing countries.  This tendency supported a clear 
vertical orientation in outward investment from Singapore to Asian developing economies, 
particularly in ASEAN, as headquarters operations in the former sought lower-wage labor for 
production in the latter.  Based on the results using ASEAN market size, some of this trend 
could be ascribed to incoming investments from industrialized countries in skill-intensive 
regional headquarters services in Singapore, which in turn re-invest in ASEAN. Finally, 
analysis of the earlier and later sub-periods suggests that in the 1988-2003 period inward 
FEI, especially from industrialized countries, was strongly attracted by the growing relative 
skilled-labor abundance in Singapore.    
 
EXAMPLES OF MNES SETTING UP REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN   
 
Table 1.  Second-Stage Tobit Results for Singapore’s Aggregate Bilateral Inbound and 












1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003




   UK 
 
    
USA 
 
                               
   A u s t r a l i a                 
    
               Netherlands 
              
           Germany 
Skill Differences 
                                     
                    
                   Japan         Year 